Identifying the Pitfall of Misused Data Science in Business (2015)

 

The PseudoScience of Bad Data Science

 

Let us bake cupcakes for a moment.  Better yet, let us start a cupcake bakery shop.  There are two basic approaches.

 

1. We have been eating cupcakes since time immemorial.  Our earliest memories are of eating cupcakes of the kind Grandma Mae used to bake.  We remember sitting in her kitchen, watching her patiently sift flour, sugar, cream, butter, and eggs all in her sure, loving, timeless, caring way.  She would slowly and gently layer the ingredients, feeling, touching, and balancing them the whole time.  Each cupcake was a product of a lifetime of love, patience, and care.  The final product was something her customers would travel for miles to taste.  Each cupcake was a bite of happiness, a return to childhood.  Each bite was a morale boost, re-energizing and re-charging each customer in ways far more important than the mere caloric.  And because of this, Grandma Mae was happy to wake each morning at 4:30 to prepare batches of cupcakes for her customers.  Nay, not her customers, but her guests.  Nay, not even that but her family. 

 

The business challenge is scaling up.  When Grandma Mae retires or needs to expand, how can we find others who can carry on the cupcake shop?  How can we train those willing to bake happiness in a cup?  How can we pass her skills and talents on through time (next generations) and space (expansion into new shops)?  How can we replicate that which is unique?  How can we replace the irreplaceable?  This is not an easy task.

 

2. We see cupcake shops and notice they are profitable and thriving.  Federal Cupcakes.  Commonwealth Cakes.  Sweet Bakery.  Cupcakes on Fifth.  Crumbs.  So we want in on the cupcake business.

 

We get funding from venture capital.  The founders become Chief Executives.  We spend $$$ on getting the location and finding the perfect name.  Thumbs.  Then we use leftovers to hire the best chefs and talent.  We put the talent and staff through the most vigorous hiring tests to ensure they can run the equipment.  We can’t wait three days turnaround for each cupcake test.  We get the process down with toasters and high-speed fryers to 5 minutes.  With this winning technology, we can generate thousands of different cupcakes for taste testing.  Each cupcake is a mini thumb sized cake.  Thumbs. 

 

Test time.  We database the living daylights out of the cupcake sample polls.  We find that people actually like one of the cupcake flavors.  We run correlation analyses to tease apart this cupcake from the others.  Our conclusion: it is an organic wheat flour harvested on the third evening before the fall equinox while under a howling wolf and after the Washington Redskins won their final home game in the football season.  

 

Since the recipe was created on the capital- intensive technology, there is no weepingly challenging task of scaling up or translation into a capital-intensive technology.  The business challenge is getting the secret recipe that works.  But we can use the capital-intensive technology to do that too.  We can put the proverbial cart before the horse.

 

Which cupcake bakery should we work for?  Which one should we start or fund?  The first is dogged by the age-old problem in business: once we have success, how do we do the much harder work to scale it?  The second is dogged by the promise of technology: once we have scale, how do we use it to do the much harder work to get success? 

 

Hold on a second – how can it be that scaling the success is harder than getting it, yet finding success is harder than scaling it?   They can’t both be correct!  If the first is true, then getting the harder scaling part down first should mean we are almost done.  We have the Chief Executives, the fancy location, and the talented high-speed, low-latency cupcake chefs.  All we need to do is turn the production scaling around and point it at the recipe search. 

 

Except that in this case, we really do not have any Chief Executives.  We have a bunch of people with fancy titles who de facto abdicated the responsibility over to the talented high-speed, low-latency cupcake chefs.  The chefs can take any recipe and turn out a batch of cupcakes in 5 minutes.  But they do not have any recipe.  That was the job of the business side – the Chief Executives.  There is the shop and the fryers and the toasters and the infrastructure.  But there is no cupcake.  There is no business model.  We do not actually know what we want to bake.  We have not communicated to the talented chefs any direction other than “Make me a successful cupcake,” because we do not know any more.  Might as well ask them to “Make me a successful business.”  Catering to the polls, the chefs have a high probability of making spurious cupcakes that sell sporadically and cannot be fixed since no know really knows what it is.  The cupcakes make no sense.  But they were made perfectly and fast.

 

Now let us not bake cupcakes in a bakery shop.  Let us run an advertisement and marketing firm.  Let us sell news.  Let us sell financial instruments.  Let us sell car insurance based on mobile phone activity.  Let us stop crime.  But instead of hiring talented chefs, we hire a bunch of talented high-speed, low-latency SQL report writers or Support Vector Machine operators or Principal Component Analysis experts to find us the way through data mining and data science.  We shall put the pressure and responsibility on them to “Make us a successful business model” by “Telling a story with the data.” 

 

And we wonder why the product works sporadically and is extraordinarily difficult to modify or adjust or fix.  The Washington Redskins Rule fallacy bases a US presidential election prediction solely on the outcome of the Redskins’ home game immediately prior to the election.  The rule correctly predicted the presidential winner 95% of the time.  This puts the Redskins predictive feature at the top of any data science analysis.  There are no known data science analyses that can filter this predictive feature “ingredient” out of the final product. Except that it makes no sense.  Think about it for a moment.  How could 11 players decide the fate of the US presidential election and change the world? 

 

The answer is prosaic and simple: they don’t.  How well does the Baltimore Ravens’ final home game predict the election?  Second to last home game?  Third to last away game?  How about the New England Patriots first home game?  Combination of third home game after the first winter storm but before the winter solstice?  Plotting these game rules by their scores would yield something like this:

 

With enough attempts, anyone can win the lottery multiple times.  With enough people, someone is going to win the lottery multiple times.

 

“Scientifically” testing billions of combinations of feature ingredients is not actually scientific or science at all if there is no underlying theory.  “Scientifically” sifting through Petabytes of data is not really scientific or science – regardless of how quickly we can do so.  Any four-year old watching PBS Kids’ Professor Wiseman knows why.  It is more basic than basic science 101. 

 

The first step in science is to frame a hypothesis/question.  The next step is to decide what kinds of observations to collect to confirm or deny that hypothesis.  If the observations do not make conclusive sense one way or another, reframe the hypothesis/question.  A real scientist never starts with a full mass of undisciplined collected data, no matter how many sexy Petabytes it takes over how many years.  That data is useless if it were not collected to test a hypothesis or answer a well-framed question.  Basing any research on pre-collected data merely biases the question towards the data to answer what can be done with that data.  In economic-speak, this is a sunk cost.  In finance-speak, this is throwing good money after bad.  

 

The mass of stored data is so seductive because it is packaged in a fancy technology that the uninitiated do not understand.  It is the fancy emperor’s clothes where everyone is afraid to challenge it and thereby take the risk of looking uninformed and uninitiated.  So let us end first by inoculating ourselves against this seduction of big data on people and to clearly state that the emperor is NC-17 rated.  Regarding the Petabytes of stored personal online use data, ask ourselves how many Petabytes of data do we store everyday with our eyes and ears noticing customers?  Would they be measured in Petabytes or Zettabytes?  Has anyone ever tried to even answer what Petabytes of stored data means in relation to what we do everyday with our own eyes, ears, hands, and speech?  Do Petabytes of stored data become less impressive after such a comparison? In all the rush with technology, we seem to have forgotten the people at the center of the people data the technology was supposed to help us for.

 

Second, let us not focus on using technology to find the successful business model.  Instead let us focus on using technology to scale it, as in the first scenario.  The age-old hard business challenge of scaling success when we have it is age-old for a reason.  Finding success is being human.  Scaling it is to understand being human.  Rather than forcing the human to operate on terms of technological scaling machines, perhaps we can force the technological scaling machine to operate on terms of humans. 

And finally, the answer to how to detect the fallacy in the Washington Redskins Rule: or how to detect a likely fake association from a likely real one if someone really needed to go down this path.  If the Washington Redskins team performance really does somehow predict the presidential election results, there should be consistency either temporally or spatially or both.  That is, in 1940-1960, the Washington Redskins team performance should be 66% accurate.  Then in 1960-1980 is should be 83% accurate, with the 1980-2000 showing 95% accuracy.  Or the nearby Seattle Seahawks would have 80% accuracy while the farther away San Francisco 49ers would have 60% accuracy.  If adjacent periods of time or space had similar results, then the results would be intriguing - but not conclusive!  Otherwise, the inconsistency in the random pattern provides evidence of it being… random.